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The Evils of Forced Migration: Do Integration Policies 
Alleviate Migrants’ Economic Situations? 
 
Abstract 
Armed conflicts, natural disasters and infrastructure projects continue to force millions into 
migration. This is especially true for developing countries. After World War II, about 8 
million ethnic Germans experienced a similar situation when forced to leave their homelands 
and settle within the new borders of West Germany. Subsequently, a law was introduced to 
foster their labor market integration. We evaluate the success of this law using unique 
retrospective individual-level panel data. We find that the law improved expellees’ overall 
situation but failed to restore their pre-war occupation status. This holds implications for the 
design of integration policies today. 
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I. Introduction 
Armed conflicts, natural disasters, or large-scale infrastructure projects can cause significant 
migration flows within countries. Examples include the Darfur conflict, which ended in 
August 2009 and displaced 2.7 million people (Olson 2011); 1.7 million people displaced by 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (Athukorala and Resosudarmo, 2005); and tens of millions 
of people displaced simply by the damming of rivers, such as the million-plus individuals 
who were relocated upon the completion of the Three Gorges Dam in China (World 
Commission on Dams, 2000). Despite these sizeable figures, there has been little research on 
forced migration flows and, more importantly, policies to alleviate the consequences of those 
flows. This lack of research is presumably due to the limited availability of data which can 
restrict more detailed analyses. Furthermore, existing literature on (internal) migration, driven 
by economic opportunities, does not help us understand forced migration flows because those 
migrants are likely to be a selective group of individuals.
1
 To overcome this problem, 
Sarvimäki et al. (2009) have focused on a historical situation which has provided suitable 
data to derive policy implications.  
We complement this emerging literature and study the effect of an integration policy in the 
context of a forced mass migration that occurred in the aftermath of WWII, possibly one of 
the largest mass migration shocks ever experience by a developed country in modern history. 
About 8 million ethnic Germans (hereafter, expellees) were forced to leave their homelands 
in East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, and Bohemia and settle within the new borders of West 
Germany (cf. Schmidt 1994).
2
 This forced mass migration affected all individuals, regardless 
of social status or skill level, and, accordingly, there are no status- or skill-specific selection 
issues. Upon their arrival, the migrants were primarily distributed across the U.S. and British 
                                                          
1
 See Borjas (1994, 1999) for an extensive review of the economics of immigration. 
2
 Another 4 million expellees settled in East Germany and about half a million in Austria. However, in this 
paper, we focus on the expellees who settled in West Germany. 
zones of occupation in Germany according to a central allocation formula (cf. Edding 1952; 
Grosser 2001, 2006; Hofmann 2000). The unexpectedly large number of expellees eventually 
rendered impossible the idea of complementing regional labor markets with the expellees’ 
skills. Thus, regional selection at the destination plays no major role and, as the immigrants 
are all ethnic Germans, cultural and language issues can also be ruled out. 
The absence of selectivity allows us to compare the expellees to the local West Germans. A 
simple comparison of the two groups’ occupational status before and after WWII reveals that 
many expellees experienced an enormous loss in status as a large fraction ended up working 
as unskilled workers. After the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949, the 
Federal Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) was introduced (in 1953) to improve the 
overall situation of the expellees and restore to them the status they held prior to WWII. Part 
of this law was aimed at improving the expellees’ economic situation through the 
reintegration into agriculture of those who had worked in this sector before the war; easing 
entry into occupations like doctors or lawyers; and promoting self-employment and 
entrepreneurship. For example, individuals were granted credit at a reduced interest rate or 
tax credits when starting a business. 
To evaluate the effect of this integration policy, we exploit for the first time in economic 
literature data from the 1971 micro census that allow us to identify and distinguish expellees 
from local West Germans.
3
 Moreover, the 1971 census contains a special survey of expellees 
and includes information about their occupational status before WWII in 1939 and after 
WWII in 1950 and 1960. Based on this retrospective information, we set up a quasi-panel and 
evaluate the immigrant legislation in a difference-in-differences framework. To account for 
unobserved immigration effects unrelated to the policy, we create a second control group and 
integrate it in a triple-difference approach. This second control group consists of East 
Germans who immigrated to West Germany before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. These 
immigrants were to some extent comparable (i.e., no language barriers) to the expellees but 
they were not covered by the Federal Expellee Law. As the East German immigrants do 
differ to some extent from the expellees, we apply matching techniques on observable 
variables in 1939 to make this second control group (i.e., East German refugees) comparable 
to the expellees in terms of pre-war characteristics. Our results suggest that expellees’ overall 
situation was somewhat improved by the Federal Expellee Law, but that the law failed to 
restore them to their pre-war occupational status. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the historical 
background. Section 3 introduces our data and Section 4 explains our identification strategy. 
Results are provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Historic Context 
The significant territorial changes that occurred in the aftermath of WWII resulted in large 
migration streams across Europe. The biggest of these involved almost 8 million ethnic 
Germans who were forced by the Red Army and, after WWII, the Potsdam Treaty to leave 
their homelands in East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, East Brandenburg, and the Sudetenland 
and settle within the new borders of West Germany. This forced mass migration affected all 
ethnic German individuals regardless of their social status or skill level (Bethlehem 1982; 
Schmidt 1994). Table 1 illustrates the distribution of expellees across West German states in 
absolute numbers, as a fraction of the expellee population, and as a fraction of the local West 
German population. 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
The distribution mechanism of expellees (Heimatvertriebene) across settlement states worked 
in the following way. In the period between the end of WWII in 1945 and the foundation of 
the two separate German states in 1949, the allied powers divided Germany into four 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3
 For a description of these data in the context of expellees, see Luettinger (1989). 
occupation zones. Figure 1 shows the four occupation zones, along with the predominantly 
ethnic German areas where the expellees lived before WWII. In 1949, the French, British, 
and U.S. zones of occupation were merged into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
while the Soviet zone became the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR). Table 1 
reveals that there was an especially pronounced difference in the number of expellees in the 
French occupation zone compared to the other zones. This is due to the French authorities’ 
desire for inhabitants and occupying soldiers to be self-sufficient in terms of food production, 
thus restricting the number of people competing for already scarce resources (Grosser 2001). 
As a result, Rhineland-Palatine and the French-occupied areas in Baden-Württemberg 
initially did not experience any inflow of expellees.
4
 The other zones’ occupation authorities 
distributed the expellees according to a central formula based on the availability of nutrition 
and housing space. Since most German cities were destroyed and nutrition and housing were 
more plentiful available in rural areas, the vast majority of expellees were settled in the 
countryside (cf. Brakman et al. 2004; Grosser 2006). 
<< Insert Figure 1 about here >> 
The economic situation of most expellees was precarious. Some of them were able to meet at 
least a part of their needs by working as unskilled labor in the agricultural sector, but many 
suffered hunger and had to beg or steal to fulfill their basic needs (Vaskovics 2002). Since 
much of the economic infrastructure was destroyed in post-war Germany, few salaried jobs 
were available and competition for them was fierce. In this competition, the locals, with 
already established networks, had the advantage. In many regions, expellees were viewed as a 
burden and this was reflected in governmental restrictions on their rental contracts (Schaut 
1995). Often, expellees were refused the permits necessary for starting a business. Attaining 
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 Only after 1948 did authorities order internal reallocations from regions with a high number of expellees to 
those with fewer, particularly to the French regions. Thus, by 1956, about 1 million expellees had been forced to 
relocate again. 
recognition of formal occupational qualifications, e.g., certificates for lawyers or doctors, was 
complicated (Müller 1993; Schaut 1995). There were barriers to accessing capital because 
banks did usually not provide credit to expellees without any collateral. As a result, in 1953, 
only a small fraction of expellees worked in the same field or occupation as they had in 1939 
(Schaut 1995). 
In 1953, the German government introduced the Federal Expellee Law 
(Bundesvertriebenengesetz) with the goal of restoring the expellees’ status quo and 
improving their situation. The law provided official acceptance and legitimation for a wide 
range of occupational certificates held by expellees, including those of doctors, dentists, and 
craftsmen (§§ 69–71). The law improved access to capital for founding a business, provided 
tax incentives for self-employment (§§ 72 and 73), helped integrate into the agriculture sector 
those who had been farmers prior to WWII (§§ 35–68), offered better opportunities to rent 
state-owned property for business purposes (§ 76), and ensured that businesses run by 
expellees were treated preferentially when public contracts were awarded (§§ 74 and 75). 
The law set out eligibility requirements for these privileges, certain of which were tied to 
having an official status as an expellee (Categories A and B). This status was defined in 
Section 1 of the 1953 Federal Expellee Law, and defines an expellee as being either a 
German citizen or an ethnic German who before and/or during World War II lived within the 
1917–1937 borders of eastern Germany and Austria-Hungary. In addition to expellees, 
political refugees from the socialist GDR (and, prior to 1949, the Soviet zone) were also 
covered by this law (§ 3). However, to qualify as ―eligible refugees‖ (Category C), GDR 
refugees had to prove that they had suffered ―a direct threat to life and limb or their personal 
freedom‖ (Ackermann 1995, p. 13). 
Beside the group of eligible refugees who were covered by the integration policy, there was a 
large group of refugees from the GDR who did not qualify for support under the Federal 
Expellee Law (cf. Ackerman 1995; Heidemeyer 1994; Hoffmann 2000). As it became clear 
that Germany’s separation was permanent and that East Germany was adopting a Soviet 
system, many East Germans looked west for political freedom and economic prosperity. 
More than 2.75 million people fled East Germany to resettle in West Germany prior to 
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and, like the expellees, the refugees from the GDR 
were centrally distributed across the federal states according to §17(1) of the 1950 
provisional accommodation law (Notaufnahmegesetz). The provisional accommodation law 
granted some financial support to the refugees but it was far less extensive than that available 
under the Federal Expellee Law. In the empirical section of this paper, we focus on expellees 
in Categories A and B only, omitting from our analysis those refugees from East Germany 
(Category C) who were covered by the Federal Expellee Law. Given their political motives 
for leaving East Germany, these refugees are probably a highly distinctive group and 
including them in our empirical analyses could bias our estimates of the effect of the Federal 
Expellee Law. Table 2 summarizes the different groups of ethnic German immigrants and 
their eligibility for benefits under the Federal Expellee Law. 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
3. Data on Expellees and Refugees from the Soviet Zone of Occupation After WW II 
Our primary source of data is the German micro census, which provides official 
representative statistics for the population and labor market in Germany. With its sampling of 
1 percent of the population, it is the largest ousehold survey in Europe. The micro census is a 
random sample combining a one-stage cluster sample design with a partial rotation 
procedure. In each sampling district, chosen from within the territory of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, all households and persons are interviewed. Every year one-quarter of the 
sample households is replaced. 
We generate our data set from an extension of the 1971 German micro census (MZU 1971). 
This extension was designed to gain insight into expellees’ integration into the German labor 
market and society. It is particular interesting for our analysis since the survey contains 
detailed retrospective information on the occupational and economic status of the German 
population in 1939, 1950, and 1960; we use this information to construct a quasi-panel data 
set. 
The data include expellee identifiers, detailed information on individuals’ state of residence 
in 1939, and their time of arrival within the new borders of West Germany. As summarized in 
Table 2, we define a person as an expellee if he or she (1) possesses a Category A or B pass, 
(2) lived in the former eastern territories of the German Reich or Austria-Hungary in 1939, 
and (3) arrived within the new borders of Germany between 1945 and 1950. This allows us to 
distinguish expellees from Eastern Europe who were forced to migrate immediately after 
WWII from those who came during the Nazi regime or those who voluntarily arrived after 
1950 in search of economic opportunities. After excluding individuals with missing data on 
occupational status in 1939, 1950, or 1960, our sample contains 25,713 expellees. By 
restricting the analysis to individuals who had completed their education by 1939, we can 
compare all individuals’ occupational status before and after WWII. This restriction carries 
the cost of losing 2,530 observations, leaving us with 23,183 observations in the expellee 
group. The sample also includes 146,786 local West Germans and 3,100 East Germans who 
migrated to West Germany during 1945 and 1950, 2,093 of whom were not accepted as 
political refugees and therefore were not covered by the Federal Expellee Law. Given an 
overall population of roughly 50 million in West Germany in 1950, this sample is a good 
representation of the population shares, i.e., the group of expellees (8 million) being about 15 
percent of the local West German population and the refugees from East Germany (2.75 
million) about 5 percent. 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
Table 3 shows the occupational status of local West Germans and expellees before and after 
WWII. In 1939, the expellees’ occupational structure is very similar to that of local West 
Germans. Presumably due to the loss of their property, in 1950 a smaller fraction of expellees 
was self-employed (compared to local West Germans) and we observe almost no self-
employed farmers. We further observe that disproportionate numbers of expellees either 
worked in unskilled occupations or did not work at all in 1950. The fraction of expellees 
reporting non-employment or pensioner status increased from 2.7 percent in 1939 to 9 
percent in 1950. 
The simple comparison of occupational status before and after WWII reveals that the 
expellees experienced an enormous loss in status, which explains their highly 
disadvantageous economic situation. As a response, in 1953, the German government 
introduced the Federal Expellee Law. The success of this law is evaluated in the next section. 
4. Identification Strategy: From DiD to DiDiD 
Based on our quasi-panel, we evaluate the success of the Federal Expellee Law in a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) framework (see Campbell 1969; Card and Sullivan 1988; 
Card 1990). First, we compare the expellees’ economic situation in 1939, i.e., before the 
displacement, with their economic situation in 1960, i.e., after the Federal Expellee Law was 
introduced. This first step evaluates whether the law was successful in restoring the 
expellees’ status quo. Given that the 1953 Federal Expellee Law was intended to address the 
expellees’ disadvantageous economic situation after WWII, we then compare the expellees’ 
economic situation in 1950, i.e., after their displacement but before the Federal Expellee Law 
was introduced, with their economic situation in 1960. This second step evaluates the law’s 
success in improving the expellees’ overall situation. Together, these two steps form the first 
difference in our DiD approach. To account for the general improvement of the economic 
situation in Germany during the ―economic miracle‖ (Wirtschaftswunder) of the 1950s, we 
then compare the evolution of the expellees’ economic situation with the evolution of local 
West Germans’ economic situation. This gives us the second difference in our DiD approach. 
In this framework, the success of the Federal Expellee Law can be formally described as 
follows: 
2 1960 1939 1960 1939
Ex Ex West West(E E ) (E E )          (1a) 
2 1960 1950 1960 1950
Ex Ex West West(E E ) (E E )           (1b) 
Here, Ex denotes expellees and West denotes local West Germans. tExE  (
t
WestE ) represents the 
average economic situation of the expellees (local West Germans) in year t. We define 
several outcome variables to assess the economic situation of expellees: the probability of 
being unemployed or employed as an unskilled worker; the probability of working in the 
agricultural sector after WWII conditional on working in that sector in 1939; and the 
probability of being self-employed in the agricultural sector as well as in the non-agricultural 
sectors of manufacturing and services. 
To derive the DiD estimator Δ2 from Equation (1), we use the 1939 or 1950 and 1960 
information for our sample of expellees and local West Germans and solve the following 
equation in first differences: 
i,1960 1939 i iE Ex            (2a) 
i,1960 1950 i iE Ex            (2b) 
Here, i,1960 1939E   (respectively, i,1960 1950E  ) is the observed difference in the economic 
situation of individual i, Exi is a dummy variable that identifies the expellees, and i  is a 
standard error term. Appropriate controls for individual characteristics such as gender or 
educational endowment are time constant and therefore drop out in our model. Equations (2a) 
and (2b) are equivalent to regressions with individual fixed effects. The coefficient of interest 
is β, which measures the DiD estimator Δ2 described in Equation (1). 
Interpreting 2  as a causal effect of the Federal Expellee Law is based on the strong 
assumption that the expellees’ economic situation would have evolved similar to that of local 
West Germans in the absence of the Federal Expellee Law. In other words, our DiD approach 
in Equation (2b) assumes that in the absence of the Federal Expellee Law, there would have 
been no catching-up by expellees due to a progressive integration of the expellees in West 
Germany. To relax this assumption, we consider an additional control group: those refugees 
who came to West Germany from the Soviet zone of occupation before construction of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961 and who were not covered by the Federal Expellee Law (non-eligible 
refugees; cf. Table 2). Based on this second control group, we establish a difference-in-
differences-in-differences (DiDiD) approach that controls for two trends (see Hamermesh and 
Trejo 2000). First, it covers the general economic improvement that occurred during 
Germany’s economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) of the 1950s by considering the evolution 
of the local West Germans’ economic situation. Second, it accounts for the general progress 
of integration by considering the evolution of the economic situation of non-eligible refugees 
from the Soviet zone of occupation. In the DiDiD framework, the effect of the Federal 
Expellee Law is formalized as follows: 
3 2 2
Ex Non West           (3) 
with 
2 1960 1950 1960 1950
Ex Ex Ex East East(E E ) (E E )          (3a) 
2 1960 1950 1960 1950
Non West Non West Non West West West(E E ) (E E )          (3b) 
Again, Ex denotes expellees and Non-West covers both immigrant groups, i.e., the expellees 
and non-eligible refugees from the Soviet zone of occupation (East). 2Non West  is the DiD 
estimator that compares the evolution of the immigrants’ economic situation with the 
evolution of the local West Germans’ economic situation. 2Ex  is the DiD estimator that 
compares the evolution of the expellees’ economic situation with the evolution of the 
economic situation of non-eligible refugees from the Soviet zone of occupation. Thus, in 
order to interpret the DiDiD estimator 3  as a causal effect of the Federal Expellee Law on 
the expellees’ economic situation, the identifying assumptions are fairly weak in this DiDiD 
approach, requiring only that there is no contemporaneous shock that specifically affects the 
expellees’ economic situation relative to the local West Germans’ economic situation during 
the period the Federal Expellee Law was effective (see Gruber 1994). 
To obtain the DiDiD estimator 3 , we extend our sample by adding the non-eligible refugees 
from the Soviet zone of occupation and derive, in analogy to Equation (2), the following 
regression equation: 
i,1960 1950 i i iE Ex Non-West           (4) 
In this extended equation, Non-Westi is a dummy variable that identifies immigrants 
including both expellees and non-eligible refugees from the Soviet zone of occupation. The 
coefficient of interest that identifies the DiDiD estimator 3  described in Equation (3) is β. 
5. Micro Evidence on the Evaluation of an Integration Policy 
The identifying assumption for applying a difference-in-differences approach is the 
comparability of our treatment and control groups, namely, the expellees, the local West 
Germans, and East German refugees. Therefore, we first show that the pre-war differences 
between the expellees and local West Germans are very small. We then present the 
difference-in-differences, as well as the triple-difference results where we control for the 
ongoing social integration of immigrants. Since we find some pre-war differences between 
the expellees and the non-eligible refugees from East Germany, in the last subsection we 
improve the comparability of our groups by using a propensity score matching method. 
Pre-War Characteristics 
Table 4 provides sample means of the pre-war characteristics of local West Germans 
(Column 1) and the expellees (Column 2). Importantly, we find very small differences 
between the two in 1939 in terms of demographic statistics, educational endowment, and 
occupational structure. Virtually all local West Germans and all expellees received at least 
basic schooling and in both groups about 6 percent completed advanced secondary education. 
The most important difference in occupational structure is that expellees are more likely to 
work as self-employed farmers before WWII compared to West Germans. This might also 
explain the larger fractions of expellees who own real estate and work in a family business as 
compared to West Germans. 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
Effects of the Federal Expellee Law Using a Difference-in-Differences Approach 
Table 5a reports difference-in-differences estimates from a regression of the change in the 
defined outcome variables between 1939 and 1950 on expellee status, i.e., it compares the 
expellees’ occupational status to that of the West German control group before and after their 
displacement. The results confirm the expellees’ loss in status, since their probability of 
working as unskilled workers or being unemployed is positive and highly significant. The 
difference-in-differences estimates between 1939 and 1960 allow us to investigate whether 
the law was successful in restoring the expellees’ status quo. Table 5b shows that the 
expellees’ loss of status persists over time, i.e., even after introduction of the Federal 
Expellee Law, expellees were more likely to work as unskilled workers and less likely to be 
self-employed. For example, in 1950, expellees are about 9 percentage points more likely to 
work in an unskilled occupation compared to local West Germans. By 1960, this probability 
decreases, but only to 7.6 percentage points. Since the displacement was an extreme 
intervention with irreversible implications, we now focus on analyzing on whether, and if so, 
to what extent, the expellees’ situation was improved by enactment of the Federal Expellee 
Law. 
<< Insert Table 5a and 5b about here >> 
Table 6 reports difference-in-differences estimates from a regression of the change in the 
outcome variables between 1950 and 1960 on expellee status, i.e., it compares the expellees’ 
occupational status to that of the West German control group before and after the introduction 
of the Federal Expellee Law. Columns 1 and 4 suggest that the law succeeded in reducing the 
vulnerability of expellees to unemployment or work as unskilled labor. The probability of 
unemployment decreases by almost 3 percentage points and the probability of being an 
unskilled worker decreases by about 1 percentage point; both results are highly significant. 
Also, the promotion of entrepreneurship through facilitating access to credits or tax 
incentives shows significant and positive effects, though the magnitude is very small. 
However, reintegration into the agricultural sector of those who had worked in that sector 
prior to WWII failed. To account for the possibility that integration into the labor market 
might depend on an individual’s former occupational status, we additionally consider dummy 
variables indicating an individual’s occupational status in 1939. The coefficients of interest 
remain mostly unaffected. 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
To interpret our findings as a causal effect of the Federal Expellee Law, we have to assume 
that expellees are non-mobile. The expellees’ initial distribution across regions was arguably 
random, but if, between 1950 and 1960, the expellees chose to move to economically 
prosperous regions, any positive effect we might find would suffer from a selection bias. We 
therefore use additional data sets to confirm that expellees’ mobility was limited. First, the 
Statistics of German Cities allow us to compare the share of expellees in 1950 with the share 
in 1961 for 115 cities. For these cities, the correlation coefficient of the observed fraction of 
expellees in 1950 and 1961 is about 0.79 and highly significant. Second, the repeated cross-
sections of the micro census of 1962, 1965, and 1969 allow us to compare the population 
fractions of expellees by size of municipality over time. We find that the population fractions 
of expellees by size of municipality did not significantly change over time, suggesting that 
expellees did not move from rural areas to urban areas in an effort to improve their economic 
situation. 
Furthermore, comparing the economic development of expellees to that of local West 
Germans in a difference-in-differences approach does not permit us to disentangle the causal 
effect of the Federal Expellee Law from other unobserved immigration effects. We therefore 
control for such unobserved immigration effects by integrating non-eligible refugees from 
East Germany in our estimations, which results in a DiDiD specification. 
 
Effects of the Federal Expellee Law Using a Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences 
Approach 
Table 7 shows the results from a difference-in-differences-in-differences estimation that 
accounts for unobserved immigration effects by additionally comparing expellees to the 
group of East German refugees without expellee status who came to West Germany between 
1945 and 1950. By considering these non-eligible East German refugees as a second control 
group, we control for immigrant-specific trends. Interestingly, we now find insignificant 
effects for the promotion of both non-agricultural and agricultural entrepreneurship among 
the expellees. In fact, the results show that the promotion of entrepreneurship was successful 
among the whole group of immigrants, implying a general catch-up process rather than true 
success of the Federal Expellee Law. Also, the reduced vulnerability to unemployment seems 
to be a general immigration trend. However, the absolute coefficient indicating the 
probability of becoming an unskilled worker increased, i.e., after introduction of the Federal 
Expellee Law, expellees were 4.2 percentage points less likely to be employed in unskilled 
occupations compared to East German non-eligible refugees. Table 7 also reports difference-
in-differences-in-differences estimates controlling for occupational status in 1939. The sign 
and magnitude of the coefficients of interest remain largely unaffected, though some of the 
significance is gone. 
Extending our difference-in-differences approach necessitates the assumption that our treatment group 
and the second control group—the non-eligible refugees—are comparable in their pre-war 
characteristics. However, Column 3 of Table 4 indicates that non-eligible refugees from East 
Germany differ from local West Germans and expellees. For instance, the average fraction of 
females (55%) is 4–5 percentage points lower in this group than it is in the group of West 
Germans and expellees, and marriage propensities are larger. Further, East German non-
eligible refugees have more schooling and there are almost no self-employed farmers among 
them. These findings clearly demonstrate that the non-eligible refugees from East Germany 
were a self-selected group of individuals searching for economic freedom. 
To increase the comparability between the expellees and our second control group, non-
eligible refugees from East Germany, we next combine our difference-in-differences-in-
differences methodology with propensity score matching techniques. 
<< Insert Table 7 about here >> 
Matching Results 
By combining our difference-in-differences-in-differences methodology with propensity 
score matching, we increase the comparability between the expellees and our second control 
group, the non-eligible refugees. Based on gender, education, and occupational status 
characteristics as observed in 1939, we estimate the propensity score, that is, the conditional 
probability to be treated for expellees and non-eligible refugees (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, 
1985). We then select the five nearest neighbors among the group of non-eligible refugees in 
terms of propensity score values and obtain the frequency with which the observation is 
matched. By using those frequencies as weights for the non-eligible refugees, we estimate our 
difference-in-differences-in-differences regressions. 
Table 8 shows weighted sample means of the pre-war characteristics of the expellees and 
non-eligible refugees from East Germany. Compared to Table 4, there are now hardly any 
pre-war differences between the groups. 
Table 9 reports weighted difference-in-differences-in-differences regression estimates. 
Interestingly, there are no longer any significant coefficients for promotion of self-
employment. However, the point estimate for the probability of being employed as an 
unskilled worker increases and is highly significant. The probability of working in an 
unskilled occupation is 14.1 percentage points larger for both immigrant groups. However, 
the Federal Expellee Law reduced expellees’ probability of working in an unskilled 
occupation by 15.1 percentage points compared to matched non-eligible refugees. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we use unique panel data from an extension of the German micro census to 
evaluate the evolution of the economic situation of ethnic German expellees after World War 
II. To evaluate the success of the 1953 Federal Expellee Law, which was introduced with the 
aim of ameliorating the disastrous situation of expellees upon their arrival in West Germany, 
we compare the evolution of the expellees’ economic situation with that of two control 
groups, local West Germans and non-eligible refugees from the Soviet zone of occupation 
who were not covered by the Federal Expellee Law. 
Germany suffered heavy damage with a great deal of its urban housing stock being destroyed 
during WWII. As a result, many local West Germans found themselves in a poor economic 
situation directly following the war, although recovery soon followed in the guise of the 
economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) of the 1950s. The WWII shock was most severe for 
the expellees because they were forced to leave their homelands and thus lost their 
possessions and suffered the severing of their social ties. Accordingly, expellees only 
recovered slowly from the WWII shock and, despite introduction of the Federal Expellee 
Law, the gap between formerly comparable local West Germans and expellees remained. 
Nevertheless, our difference-in-differences-in-differences approach, which allows controlling 
for the ongoing social integration of expellees, reveals that the Federal Expellee Law was at 
least somewhat successful in achieving its aim of ameliorating the economic situation of 
expellees. From our estimation, we conclude that the Federal Expellee Law modestly 
contributed to expellees obtaining qualitatively better jobs. However, the law failed in its 
attempts to promote self-employment and to reintegrate expellees into the agricultural sector. 
From a policy perspective, this paper might be of special interest in the context of developing 
countries where forced mass migration still occurs today due to armed conflicts or natural 
disasters. Beyond the moderate success of the Federal Expellee Law, we find evidence that 
expellees were rather immobile after being allocated to a destination region by the authorities 
of the occupation zones. The latter finding contrasts Sarvimäki et al. (2009) who find a high 
degree of voluntary mobility after the forced migration. This mobility has a large economic 
benefit for at least some groups of displaced individuals. Combining these two findings, one 
might develop policies that encourage mobility among expellees. This may help expellees 
who do not find a job in their initial destination region to look for better matches across local 
labor markets, thus alleviating their economic situation after being forced to leave their 
homelands.  
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Figure 1: Zones of occupation and predominantly ethnic German areas 
Table 1: Heimatvertriebene by State in Post-War Germany in 1950 (Source: Statistisches Bundesamt) 
State Occupation Zone   Number of Expellees   % of Expellees   % of State Population 
Bavaria A  1,937,000  16.2  21 
Lower Saxony B  1,851,000  15.5  27 
North Rhine-Westphalia B  1,332,000  11.2  10 
Baden-Württemberg F/A  862,000  7.2  13.5 
Schleswig-Holstein B  857,000  7.2  33 
Hessen A  721,000  6  16.5 
Rhineland-Palatinate F  152,000  1.3  5 
West-Berlin A/F/B  148,000  1.2  7 
Hamburg B  116,000  1  7 
Bremen A   48,000   0.4   9 
Notes: A = American, B = British, F = French, S = Soviet. 
 
Table 2: Ethnic Germans according to state of residence in 1939, immigrant and expellee status  
Group State of Residence in 1939  Immigrant Status  
Expellee Status (Category 
A or B) 
 Observations 
West Germans West Germany  No  No  146,786 
Expellees 
Eastern parts of the German 
Reich or Austria Hungary 
 Yes  Yes  23,183 
Eligible refugees East Germany  Yes  Yes  1,007 
Non-eligible refugees East Germany  Yes  No  2,093 
Notes: Grouping is based on information from the 1971 micro census on state of residence in 1939 and expellee status. 
Table 3: Occupational status of local West Germans and expellees before and after WWII 
 Expellees  Local West Germans 
Occupational status  
1939  1950  1939  1950 
Unemployed  
0.27% 
 
3.34%   0.27% 
 
0.72% 
Unskilled worker  
20.94% 
 
25.27%  20.47% 
 
15.96% 
Entrepreneur (agricultural)  
5.08% 
 
0.68%  3.6% 
 
4.60% 
Entrepreneur (non-agricultural)  
4.59% 
 
3.71%   4.94% 
 
7.30% 
Civil servant  
3.21% 
 
1.98%  2.67% 
 
2.34% 
Civil servant (qualified)  
1.72% 
 
1.35%  1.43% 
 
1.38% 
Pensioner, other non-employed  
2.67% 
 
9.71%  2.69% 
 
5.73% 
Housewife  
26.85% 
 
34.12%  29.40% 
 
34.31% 
Other   
34.67% 
 
19.84%  34.53% 
 
27.66% 
Notes: The table shows the percentage shares of expellees and local West Germans by occupational status before and after WWII. The category “others” include employees, 
craftsmen, and family workers. 
 
Table 4: Pre-war characteristics of West Germans, expellees, and non-eligible refugees  
  
West Germans 
Expellees 
Non-Eligible 
Refugees 
Demographics    
 Female (%) 0.604 0.591 0.551 
 Age 1950 42.63 41.84 39.1 
 Married (%) 0.649 0.654 0.710 
Highest Education    
 Basic school (%) 
 (Volksschule) 
0.643 0.658 0.441 
 Secondary school (%) 0.26 0.24 0.395 
 High school (%) 0.013 0.013 0.032 
 Technical school (%) 0.048 0.045 0.088 
 University (%) 0.014 0.013 0.031 
Assets    
 Real estate 1939 (%) 0.485 0.512 0.342 
Occupation 1939    
 Unemployed 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 Unskilled worker 0.205 0.209 0.175 
 Entrepreneur (agricultural) 0.036 0.0508 0.004 
 Entrepreneur (non-agricultural) 0.049 0.05 0.04 
 Civil servant 0.027 0.032 0.037 
 Civil servant (qualified) 0.014 0.017 0.031 
 Employee 0.139 0.123 0.279 
 Craftsman 0.128 0.126 0.161 
 Pensioner, other non-employed 0.027 0.027 0.028 
 Family worker 0.077 0.094 0.023 
 Housewife 0.294 0.268 0.22 
    
Observations 146,786 23,183 2,093 
 Note: The table shows summary statistics from the 1971 micro census. 
Table 5: Regression estimates of difference in outcome variable between 1939–1950 and 1939–1969 on expellee status 
 
 
 
 
Difference in 
dependent 
variable 
(a) 
1939–1950  
 (b) 
1939–1960 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unskilled 
Worker 
Reintegration 
Agriculture 
Self-Employment Unemployment  
 Unskilled 
Worker 
Reintegration 
Agriculture 
Self-Employment Unemployment 
  
Agriculture 
Non- 
Agriculture 
     Agriculture 
Non- 
Agriculture 
 
                         
Expellee 0.089*** -0.140*** -0.054*** -0.033*** 0.026***   0.076*** -0.183*** -0.048*** -0.030*** 0.001** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
Constant -0.045*** -0.023*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.005***   -0.065*** -0.078*** 0.005*** 0.019*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
             
Observations 169969 91466 169969 169969 169969   169969 115149 169969 169969 169969 
R-squared 0.007 0.054 0.015 0.004 0.006   0.004 0.044 0.008 0.002 0.000 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences-in-differences results of the change in the outcome variable on an expellees dummy and a constant. 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 6: Regression estimates of difference in outcome variable between 1950 and 1960 on expellee status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Difference in 
Dependent 
Variable 
Unskilled Worker 
Reintegration 
Agriculture 
Self-Employment 
 Unemployment 
Agriculture Non-Agriculture 
                 
Expellee -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.020*** -0.033* -0.042*** -0.005*** 0.005 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.090*** 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.014) 
Controlling for occupational 
status in 1939 
No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
          
Observations 169,969 169,969 91,466 169,969 169,969 169,969 169,969 169,969 169,969 
R-squared 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.046 0.007 0.012 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences results of the change in the outcome variable on an expellees dummy and a constant. 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Table 7: Regression estimates of difference in outcome variable between 1950 and 1960 on expellee and immigrant status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Difference in 
Dependent 
Variable 
Unskilled Worker Reintegration 
Agriculture 
Self-Employment 
Unemployment 
Agriculture Non-Agriculture 
          
Expellee -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.044*** 0.0004 0.007*** -0.009* -0.006 -0.005 -0.007* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Immigrant 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.012*** 0.010** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -0.020*** -0.035* -0.042*** -0.005*** 0.005 -0.002*** 0.002 -0.006*** -0.089*** 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.014) 
Controlling for occupational 
status in 1939 
 
No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
          
Observations 172,062 172,062 92,632 172,062 172,062 172,062 172,062 172,062 172,062 
R-squared 0.000 0.027 0.001 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.007 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences-in-differences results of the change in the outcome variable on an expellees dummy, an immigrant dummy, and a constant. 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 8: Weighted pre-war characteristics of expellees and non-eligible refugees  
  Expellees Non-Eligible Refugees 
Demographics   
 Female (%) 0.591 0.591 
 Age in 1950 41.84 41.87 
 Married (%) 0.654 0.581 
Highest Education   
 Basic school  
 (Volksschule) (%)  
0.659 0.659 
 Secondary school (%) 0.24 0.24 
 High school (%) 0.013 0.013 
 Technical school (%) 0.045 0.045 
 University (%) 0.013 0.013 
Assets   
 Real estate 1939 (%) 0.512 0.291 
Occupation 1939   
 Unemployed 0.003 0.001 
 Unskilled worker 0.209 0.21 
 Entrepreneur (agricultural) 0.051 0.044 
 Entrepreneur (non-agricultural) 0.05 0.052 
 Civil servant 0.032 0.034 
 Civil servant (qualified) 0.017 0.017 
 Employee 0.123 0.125 
 Craftsman 0.126 0.124 
 Pensioner, other non-employed 0.027 0.028 
 Family worker 0.094 0.091 
 Housewife 0.268 0.273 
 Observations 23,139 444 
 Weights 23,139 23,139 
Note: The table shows weighted summary statistics from the 1971 micro census. The weights are obtained by 
applying a propensity score matching based on gender, education, and occupational status in 1939. 
 Table 9: Weighted regression estimates of difference in outcome variable between 1950 and 1960 on expellee and immigrant status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Difference in Dependent 
Variable 
Unskilled Worker Unemployment 
Self-Employment Reintegration 
Agriculture Agriculture Non-Agriculture 
      
Expellee -0.154*** 0.075 -0.008 0.022 -0.052*** 
 (0.053) (0.047) (0.009) (0.021) (0.003) 
Immigrant 0.141*** -0.100** 0.014 -0.018 0.040*** 
 (0.053) (0.047) (0.009) (0.021) (0.002) 
Constant -0.020*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.042*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
      
Observations 170,369 170,369 170,369 170,369 91,733 
R-squared 0.035 0.039 0.003 0.003 0.013 
Notes: This table reports weighted difference-in-differences-in-differences results of the change in the outcome variable on an expellees dummy, an immigrant dummy, and a 
constant. Weights are obtained by propensity score matching based on gender, education, and occupational status in 1939. 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
